Focusing on practical applications, this introduction to animal ethics uniquely blends philosophy with various disciplines such as animal science, conservation biology, economics, ethology, and law. It addresses both classic topics and less commonly discussed issues like pest control, providing a comprehensive and accessible framework for understanding and engaging with animal ethics.
Usually Bad, Sometimes Wrong, Often Permissible
Challenging the prevailing arguments for veganism, the book asserts that these arguments inadequately connect the production and consumption of animal-based foods. It explores the philosophical and ethical dimensions of dietary choices, questioning the assumptions behind common pro-vegan claims. By dissecting the rationale for veganism, the author invites readers to reconsider their views on food consumption and its implications for animals and society.
This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, one can justifiably believe a modal claim if (a) she justifiably believes a theory supporting that claim, (b) she bases her belief on that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief. The book is divided into two parts. The first motivates TEM, elaborates on it, and addresses various objections. The second part evaluates the worth of accepting TEM by establishing criteria for modal epistemologies, ultimately highlighting TEM’s significant virtues. However, the author acknowledges that TEM is cautious, suggesting it may imply we lack justification for some modal claims we assume we hold. This raises questions about its connection to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author examines extensively. Interestingly, TEM provides a more effective path to modal skepticism than van Inwagen's approach, which the author argues is an advantage rather than a drawback. Additionally, he contends that other popular modal epistemologies do not offer greater modal justification than TEM. The conclusion clarifies TEM's relationship with other modal epistemologies, asserting that it need not compete with them but can serve as a complementary framework.
This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda.