Redesigning Democracy

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Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision for optimal democracies and introduces new rules to help achieve them. Building on the author's previous work, it argues that while liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance, they often fail to inspire enthusiasm and can struggle with efficiency and wealth distribution. Many citizens take democracy for granted, having never experienced an alternative. The author asserts that the potential of democracies remains untapped, and that optimal democracies could serve as both a societal Utopia and a goal for scholars. The book proposes insightful rules to enhance democratic functioning, addressing the challenge of political short-termism. It explores radical yet relevant proposals, including long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets for election outcomes, minority voting, and initiative group constitutions, all grounded in economic analysis. This thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice, and mechanism design uncovers the positive effects of political contracts and new rules for agenda setting. It is a timely exploration of how to improve electoral systems for societal benefit, making it essential reading for anyone concerned about the state of democracies and seeking constructive reforms.