Kant's theory of a priori knowledge

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The prevailing interpretation of Kant’s First Critique in Anglo-American philosophy posits that his theory of a priori knowledge primarily addresses the conditions for empirical knowledge. Robert Greenberg, however, asserts that Kant is fundamentally concerned with the very possibility of a priori knowledge itself. He advances four key theses: (1) the Critique focuses on the possibility of a priori knowledge in relation to objects, rather than empirical knowledge, and Kant's theory on this is defensible; (2) Kant’s transcendental ontology must be differentiated from the conditions for a priori knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment in the Table of Judgments should be understood through Kant’s transcendental logic as having substantive content, rather than merely as logical forms; (4) the distinction between ordering relations and reference relations must be considered to avoid misinterpretations of the Critique. Throughout, Greenberg contrasts his views with those of prominent Kant commentators like Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. This fresh perspective not only challenges dominant interpretations but also aligns more closely with Kant’s original intent, offering a clearer understanding of the seemingly discordant themes in the First Critique.